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Abstract
This Note reaches the contrary conclusion that the French nationalization of American sub-
sidiaries fits within the territorial exception to the act of state doctrine.
THE TERRITORIAL EXCEPTION TO THE ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE: APPLICATION TO FRENCH
NATIONALIZATION
INTRODUCTION
The Socialist government of President Francois Mitterrand
of France recently implemented a government takeover of a signifi-
cant segment of French banking and industry. On February 11,
1982, a bill' was signed into law nationalizing five major industrial
groups, 2 thirty-nine banks3 and two financial holding companies. 4
The effect of the legislation was to increase government participa-
tion in the economy to sixteen percent. 5 This increase was greater
than in any other West European nation,6 resulting in expansion of
the public sector by 900,000 employees. 7
The nationalizations form the core of the Socialists' plan for
France, 8 a policy which envisions revitalization of the economy.9
1. Law of Nationalization, No. 82-155, 1982 Journal Officiel de la Rpublique
Franpaise [J.O.] 566 (to be codified in 1982 Recuell Dalloz-Sirey, Ldgislation) [hereinafter
cited as Nationalization Bill.
2. Id. art. 1. The five industrial groups are Compagnie de Saint Gobain, Rhone-Poulenc
S.A., Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann, Compagnie G~n~rale d'tlectricit6, and Thomson-Brandt.
Id.
3. Id. art. 12. Among the banks nationalized is the reknowned Banque Rothschild. Id.
4. Id. art. 29. The financial holding companies are Compagnie financi~re de Suez et de
l'Indochine and Compagnie financi~re de Paris et des Pays-Bas. Id.
5. See National Assembly Debate on Nationalization, 1981 J.O. 5169, 5171 (statement
of M. Pierre-Bernard Coust6) (the parliamentary debate took place on Dec. 18, 1981).
6. Id.
7. The Nationalizations, Documents from France, No. 82/35, at 10 (available at the
Press and Information Service of the French Embassy, New York). Prior to the 1982 national-
izations, the public sector comprised six percent (or 1.1 million persons) of France's salaried
workforce. As a result of the nationalizations, approximately two million employees are
distributed among 3,500 companies which are controlled directly or indirectly by the state.
Id.
8. President Mitterrand was elected on May 10, 1981. In a televised interview in
December 1981, Mitterrand elaborated on the rationale for the Socialists' program:
There are several fundamental reasons for our choosing to nationalize a certain
number of firms. There is ... a kind of choice that I would call, in the proper sense
of the term, a political choice, the choice of a certain kind of society. It seems to us
that once a certain amount of capital has been accumulated and concentrated in key
sectors of the economy ... then it's indispensable for the state to have the control
and - if need be - ownership of these sectors.
Mitterrand Says Nationalizations Necessary to Wage Coherent Fight Through Credit and
Industry Against Unemployment and for Industrial Restructuring, Statements fromFrance,
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Significant government spending and expansion of state owner-
No. 81/103, at I (available at the Press and Information Service of the French Embassy, New
York) [hereinafter cited as Television Interview].
Although clothed in the politics of Western Europe, the discussion among senators in the
National Assembly before adoption of the legislation, reveals the truly socialist underpinnings
of the program:
[T]he nationalizations are a first step towards a true emancipation of the workers, a
first step towards control over working conditions by the workers themselves, a first
step towards a general reorientation of the economy by the collectivity. In the
absence of all of this, there is no true democracy.
. . . [E]xtension of the public sector well underscores the will of the collectivity
to take its destiny into its own hands and to escape domination by a few private
interests which have dominated this nation for too long ....
• . . Private industrial capital has proven itself, in effect, in capable of bringing
about a rejeuvenation and development of our apparatus of production ....
Banking capital, obsessed by short term profit and careful to avoid the simplest risk,
prospers in parasitic fashion, without attention to real needs ....
National Assembly Debate on Nationalization, 1981 J.O. 5169, 5172 (statement of
M. Philippe Bassinet) (author's translation).
9. President Mitterrand stated: "[W]e inherited a rate of inflation of 14% when we
were elected last May [1981], and we have pumped some 35 to 36 billion francs [about seven
billion dollars] into the French economy in the framework of our program to stimulate the
economy. ... Television Interview, supra note 8, at 4.
Prior to its enactment, the nationalization bill was reviewed by the Conseil Constitu-
tionel, the supreme legal tribunal in France. Judgment of Jan. 16, 1982, Con. Const., Fr.,
1982 J.O. 299 (to be reported in 1982 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence). As a matter of
French constitutional law, the government had to show that the proposed nationalization
was a clear public necessity. Constitution de la R6publique Franpaise, D6claration des
Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, art. 17. The Declaration states: "Property being an
inviolable and sacred right, no one may be deprived thereof except where a public necessity,
lawfully established, clearly so requires, and on condition of a just and prior indemnity." Id.
The Conseil Constitutionel accepted the Socialists' position that the nationalizations were
necessary to bring about economic change and growth. Judgment of Jan. 16, 1982, 1982 J.O.
at 300-01. The Conseil Constitutionel does not appear to have been impressed by the concerns
of the opposition that President Mitterrand's motives may have been ideological or political.
For a discussion of the legislation by the National Assembly, see supra note 8. Indeed, as some
commentators point out, in 1972 when the Socialists first suggested the nationalizations, the
present day economic crisis was unknown. Borde & Eggleston, The French Nationalizations,
68 A.B.A. J 422, 425 (1982).
The constitutional criteria set out in the Declaration include a requirement of compensa-
tion for expropriated property. The inadequacy of compensation was the additional basis for
rejection of the initial nationalization proposal in January 1982, by the Conseil Constitu-
tionel. Judgment of Jan. 16, 1982, 1982 J.O. at 302-03. The compensation scheme adopted
will give shareholders of nationalized companies the equivalent of 6.67 billion dollars worth
of 15 year government bonds in exchange for their shares. Nationalization Bill, supra note 1,
arts. 2-5. The Conseil Constitutionel rejected the government's initial formula for compensa-
tion which was based partly on historical share price and partly on assets and profits of the
corporations nationalized. Judgment of Jan. 16, 1982, 1982 J.O. at 304. Instead, the govern-
ment has worked out a compensation scheme to be based on the average monthly share price
between October 1, 1980 and March 31, 1981, plus 14% for inflation. Also, a dividend will
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ship 10 are being used to extricate the economy from its present
slump. 11
Among the nationalized industrial groups and banking institu-
tions are parent corporations to United States subsidiaries. 12 The
public statements of French government officials 13 indicate that the
legislation 14 is intended to reach these subsidiaries. Each enterprise
in its entirety would thereby be government-owned, enabling the
government to proceed with its plan to strengthen the economy.' 5
be paid for 1981 at a rate 14% higher than the 1980 dividend. Nationalization Bill, supra
note 1, arts. 2-5. The Conseil Constitutionel's finding that the proposed compensation was
adequate would not prevent a United States court from reconsidering the same issue and
perhaps drawing a different conclusion.
10. See generally National Assembly Debate on Nationalization, supra note 5.
11. Television Interview, supra note 8, at 4-5. The President further remarked that
investment in the private sector has been at a standstill since 1976. Id. at 6.
12. Some of the French parent corporations having American subsidiaries intended to fall
within the nationalization are: Compagnie de Saint Gobain/Certain-teed Corp., MooDY's
INDUSTIAL MANUAL 2944 (1981); Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann/Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann
Development Inc., Ugine Kuhlmann of America, Inc., Instel Corp., Howmet Aluminum
Corp., Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann Corp., Howmet Turbine Components Corp., MoonY's
INTERNATONAL MANUAL 925 (1981); Compagnie financi~re de Suez et de l'Indochine/Suez
American Corp., id. at 903 (1981); Compagnie financi~re de Paris et de Pays-Bas/Warburg-
Parisbas Inc. id.
13. See infra note 16.
14. The legislation itself is silent on the fate of foreign subsidiaries. See Nationalization
Bill, supra note 1.
15. See supra notes 8-9. The issue of extraterritorial application of laws is one which
recurs in international affairs. See, e.g., infra notes 59-110 and accompanying text. The cases
discussed infra notes 59-110 consider the effect in the United States of nationalization laws by
Iraq, Cuba and Pakistan. The recent attempt by the Reagan Administration to use trade
sanctions to bar the sale of parts manufactured abroad by foreign subsidiaries of United States
businesses to the Soviet Union for its Trans-Siberian oil pipeline is an example of the United
States attempting to extend the reach of its laws abroad. See U.S. to Penalize Those Who Aid
Siberia Pipeline, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1982, at Al, col. 5. These sanctions were imposed
pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 240-2420 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979).
In the context of nationalization, the issue may persist as nations trying to control
rampant inflation in fragile economies or groping for political leverage, nationalize key banks
and industry. See comments of President Mitterrand, Television Interview, supra note 8,
which indicate that improved management of the economy is the rationale for the French
nationalization.
Nationalization also may be used as a way for nations, particularly those in the develop-
ing world, to centralize the management of their foreign debt. In September 1982, Mexico
nationalized certain banks for precisely this reason. Mexico Seizing Banks To Curtail Flight of
Capital, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1982, at Al, col. 2. For an illustration of the use of nationaliza-
tion for political leverage, see discussion of Libyan nationalization of United States oil
interests, discussed infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. Nationalization has been a
common phenomenon throughout this century. For an overview, see E. BAKLANOFF, ExpRo-
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Resistance to French nationalization of American subsidiaries
has been a subject of concern to French government officials",
although it has not yet been the subject of litigation in United States
courts.1 7 If challenged in United States courts, France would be
likely to take the position that the act of state doctrine I bars United
States judicial review of French government acts. 19 This Note
reaches the contrary conclusion that the French nationalization of
PRIATION OF U.S. INVESTMENTS IN CUBA, MExIco, AND CHILE (1975) and M. GORDON, THE
CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY (1976).
As the international sphere and its economy become characterized increasingly by
interdependence, national boundaries tend to become less distinct. See D. BLAKE & R.
WALTERS, THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1976), wherein the authors state:
"The multinational corporation is probably the most visible vehicle for the internationaliza-
tion of the world economic system." Id. at 76. United States law, however, continues to
recognize those boundaries which is reflected in the distaste of United States courts for the
application of foreign law on United States soil. See infra Part II for discussion of the
territorial exception to the act of state doctrine whereby courts of the United States may
refuse to give extraterritorial effect to foreign laws.
16. This is reflected in press reports. An aide to Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy is quoted as
saying: "Foreign lawsuits trying to establish ownership of the subsidiaries are the most serious
threat we face." Takeovers By France Resisted, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1981, at DI, col. 1. The
aide said the French government would litigate the issue, and "only the lawyers will win."
Id. Discussing the views of French legal experts, an editorial stated: "A challenge by
stockholders and governments to the control of foreign subsidiaries will strike at the heart of
the nationalization law." Bus. WK., Dec. 21, 1981, at 66. Jean Rey, a former Common
Market Commission president expressed the opinion that "nationalization of foreign
subsidiaries could damage the economic interests of the countries they are in. . .because the
French Government may starve the operations abroad of investment capital in its drive to
lower unemployment at home." Takeovers by France Resisted, supra, at D1, col. 1.
17. It would probably be preferable from the French government's point of view to
negotiate private settlements with the United States subsidiaries. For example, France's
takeover of the French subsidiary of Honeywell Inc., a United States corporation, was
arranged by private agreement whereby Honeywell's holdings in CII-Honeywell-Bull Com-
puter Company of France will be reduced from 47 % to 19.99 %. Agreement Reached in CII-
Honeywell-Bull Takeover, News & Comments from France, No. 82/17, at 4 (Apr. 22, 1982)
(available at the Press and Information Service of The French Embassy, New York).
18. The act of state doctrine is discussed fully infra Part I.
19. An advisor to Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy is reported to have taken the position
that France is "nationalizing the stock in French companies-which hold stock in other
foreign companies - rather than seizing the tangible assets of the expropriated companies."
Bus. WK., Dec. 21, 1981, at 66. See also Borde & Eggleston, The French Nationalizations, 68
A.B.A.J. 422 (1982). The authors write:
It is claimed that by nationalizing the parent company of foreign subsidiaries, the
problems raised by the extraterritoriality principle could be avoided on the theory
that the assets located in the foreign countries remain the property of the same legal
entity, the only change being the ownership of that entity. This rationale was
proposed by the Hungarian government during its nationalizations after World War
II, but courts throughout the world held that this was only a "subterfuge" and that
the nationalizations could still be subject to their scrutiny.
Id. at 427. For an example of a case to which the authors refer, see Zwack v. Kraus Bros., 237
F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956), discussed infra note 70.
FRENCH NATIONALIZATION
American subsidiaries fits within the territorial exception 20 to the
act of state doctrine. The nationalization is therefore an appropri-
ate subject for review by courts of the United States, which should
find the legislation invalid as to American subsidiaries. 21
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
AND ITS RELEVANCE TO FRENCH NATIONALIZATION
OF AMERICAN SUBSIDIARIES
The act of state doctrine was first articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in 1897 in Underhill v. Hernandez: 22
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
20. See discussion infra Part II.
21. The question of obtaining jurisdiction to sue the government of France is beyond the
scope of this Note. The relevant law is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330, 1604-1607 (1976). While foreign governments enjoy a presumption of immunity in
United States courts, the Act provides:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States . . . in any case ....
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue
and that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for such
property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state
and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United
States ....
Id. § 1605(a).
Additionally, the Act does not provide immunity in the case of an express waiver by the
foreign sovereign or where the foreign sovereign engages in "commercial activity" having
"direct effects" in the United States. Id. For a discussion of the direct effect clause see Note,
The Nikkei Case: Toward a More Uniform Application of the Direct Effect Clause of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 4 FOHDHAM INT'L L.J. 109 (1980-81).
The Act provides for a remedy by allowing attachment of property in anticipation of
judgment:
The property in the United States of a foreign state . . . used for a commercial
activity in the United States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of
execution, or from execution . . . if ....
(3) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property which has
been taken in violation of international law or which has been exchanged for
property taken in violation of international law ...
28 U.S.C. § 1610. These portions of the Act have been interpreted to create an exception to
foreign sovereign immunity in cases where property is expropriated in violation of interna-
tional law. See Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity, 50
FORDHAM L. REv. 155, 197 (1981). See also Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976: Giving the Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 543 (1977).
22. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
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not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed
of by sovereign powers as between themselves.2 3
Subsequently many courts have invoked the doctrine.2 4 More re-
cently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine in the leading
case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.25 The Court held
that judicial review of the expropriation of sugar by Cuba was
barred,2 6 even though the taking violated international law by its
political, retaliatory and discriminatory nature. 27 The Court out-
lined several rationales for the doctrine. 28 It emphasized that nei-
ther the inherent nature of sovereignty 29 nor international law 30
23. Id. at 252.
24. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
25. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
26. Id. at 407.
27. The circumstances giving rise to the suit in Sabbatino involved Farr, Whitlock and
Co., a commodities broker, which contracted in 1960 to purchase Cuban sugar from Compa-
nia Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba (C.A.V.), a Cuban corporation whose stock
was owned principally by Americans. Id. at 401. In response to a United States reduction of
the Cuban sugar import quota by President Eisenhower, Cuba nationalized property in
which Americans had an interest. Id. The State Department characterized the Cuban
nationalization law as "manifestly in violation of those principles of international law which
have long been accepted by the free countries of the West. It is in its essence discriminatory,
arbitrary and confiscatory." Id. at 402-03 (quoting State Dep't. Note No. 397, July 16, 1960).
In order to obtain the consent of the Cuban government for the ship carrying the sugar
to leave Cuba, the broker entered a series of contracts with a Cuban bank which assigned the
bills of lading to Banco Nacional, an instrumentality of the Cuban government and petitioner
in the suit. Id. at 405. Farr, Whitlock accepted the bills of lading from petitioner, received
payment from its customer, but refused to hand over the proceeds to petitioner. Id. at 405-06.
Sabbatino became the receiver for C.A.V. Id. at 406. Suit followed for conversion of the bills
of lading and to recover payment for the sugar from Farr, Whitlock. Id.
28. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
29. 376 U.S. at 421.
If a transaction takes place in one jurisdiction and the forum is in another, the
forum does not by dismissing an action or by applying its own law purport to divest
the first jurisdiction of its territorial sovereignty; it merely declines to adjudicate or
make applicable its own law to parties or property before it.
Id. This portion of the Court's reasoning is questionable. One reason a United States court
declines such cases is that, as between nations, jurisdiction over cases is largely territorial, a
question of having the parties and the subject matter before the court. To allow United States
courts to decide legal issues arising in another country would certainly be to disregard the
independence, right to self-determination, and sovereignty of that country.
30. Id. The Court noted that other countries do not follow the doctrine with any
consistency. Id.
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compels its application. Although the United States Constitution
does not demand it, the act of state doctrine does rest on" 'constitu-
tional' underpinnings ... [which arise] out of the basic relation-
ships between branches of government in a system of separation of
powers."' 31 The Court recognized that the adjudication of certain
matters by the judiciary may hinder foreign affairs, the conduct of
which is left to the Executive branch by the Constitution .32 To
allow courts of the United States to sit in judgment on the acts of
other nations might " 'imperil the amicable relations between gov-
ernments and vex the peace of nations.' "33 This rationale is rooted
in considerations of international comity. Often more can be
achieved through diplomatic negotiation than through the combat-
iveness of litigation. 34
31. Id. at 423.
32. Id. The Court noted that the act of state doctrine "arises out of the basic relationships
between branches of government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the
competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions in
the area of international relations." Id.
33. Id. at 418 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918)).
34. See 376 U.S. at 431. Soon after the Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatino, the
Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 was passed by Congress. 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1964). The amendment provides:
[N]o court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state
doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of
international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to property is
asserted by any party including a foreign state. . . based upon (or traced through) a
confiscation or other taking. . . by an act of that state in violation of the principles
of international law ....
Id.
The legislative history of the Hickenlooper Amendment and its treatment by courts soon
after its passage indicate that the amendment was intended to be a legislative reversal of
Sabbatino. The Senate Report covering the amendment as proposed stated: "The amendment
is intended to reverse in part the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino ...." S. REP. No. 1188, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1964 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News, 3829, 3852. Senator Hickenlooper himself said: "Basically, the
amendment is designed to assure that the private litigant is granted his day in court." 110
CONG. REc. 19,547 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964). See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F.
Supp. 957, 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
956 (1968). There, considering Sabbatino on remand from the Supreme Court, Judge van
Pelt Bryan held the Hickenlooper Amendment to apply. The court wrote that the broad
purpose of the amendment was to discourage illegal confiscations and to prevent the United
States from becoming a "thieves market." 243 F. Supp. at 966. It may be of interest to note
that the constitutionality of an act of Congress expressly intending to overrule a decision of
the Supreme Court has not been litigated in this connection. Such an intent would appear to
be an affront to the doctrine of separation of powers.
Although the Supreme Court has not had the occasion to consider the Hickenlooper
Amendment, the lower federal courts have interpreted it on a case by case basis. Generally it
has been construed strictly and courts have imposed a two-fold requirement: a claim of title
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In the post-Sabbatino era, the federal courts have invoked the
act of state doctrine when reviewing Arab and Cuban nationaliza-
tion. 35 A theme common to all of these cases, including Sabbatino,
is an act of expropriation which is in essence political, and often
must be shown to property taken by the nationalizing state in violation of international law
and the property must find its way back through commercial channels into the United States.
See, e.g., infra note 37. This second requirement makes the amendment inapplicable to the
present case since the property in question is located in the United States.
While it may appear that the Hickenlooper Amendment weakens Sabbatino, nonetheless
Sabbatino was reaffirmed in Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
Dunhill gave continued vitality to the act of state doctrine more than ten years after the
Sabbatino decision. The Court gave tacit approval to Sabbatino while holding, on distin-
guishable facts, that a government acting in a purely commercial capacity may not cloak
itself in the protection of the act of state doctrine. Id. at 689-90. Counsel were specifically
requested by the Court to address the question whether Sabbattno should be reconsidered. Id.
at n.5. The Court, however, refused to disturb the Sabbatino holding. Id. at 690.
Dunhill involved competing claims by former owners of Cuban cigar companies and
Cuban interventors (a term of art referring to government-appointed managers of the busi-
ness after nationalization) for the purchase of post-intervention cigar shipments to Dunhill
and other American importers. Id. at 685. The importers sought to set-off pre-intervention
payments which should have gone to the former owners, but were mistakenly made to
interventors. Id. at 688. The Court found nothing in the record (i.e. no statute, decree, order
or resolution of the Cuban government itself) constituting an act of state with respect to the
interventor's obligation to repay the money mistakenly paid to them and allowed the set-off.
Id. at 690. The case is thus factually distinguishable from Sabbatino and the present case
where governments acted in their sovereign capacity. Relying on Sabbatino, the Dunhill
Court said: "The major underpinning of the act of state doctrine is the policy of foreclosing
court adjudications involving the legality of acts of foreign states on their own soil that might
embarrass the Executive Branch of our Government in the conduct of our foreign relations."
Id. at 697. But the Court continued, "we are in no sense compelled to recognize as an act of
state the purely commercial conduct of foreign governments in order to avoid embarrassing
conflicts. ... Id. at 697-98. For further discussion of Dunhill, see Note, Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba: The Act of State Doctrine-Altering the Sovereign's New
Cloak, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 662 (1977). See also F. Palicio y Compania v. Brush, 256 F.
Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967),
discussed infra note 42.
35. See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text. Additionally, in the antitrust field the
act of state doctrine has often been at issue, beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). There, the Court found that
the doctrine barred adjudication of the legality of the Costa Rican seizure of plaintiffs
banana plantation which, allegedly, was induced by the anti-competitive activity of the
defendant. Id. at 359. Courts have found American Banana to state an overly restrictive view
of antitrust law, and jurisdiction under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976),
now requires a showing of anti-competitive effects in the United States. Industrial Inv. Dev.
v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 53 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S.
268 (1927). For a discussion of jurisdiction in international antitrust law, see Comment,
Defining Jurisdictional Limits in International Antitrust: Should the EEC Adopt the Tim-
berlane Approach?, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 469 (1981-82). See also B. HAWK, UNITED STATES,
COMMON MARKET, AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE (1979).
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discriminatory and retaliatory.36 It is in such cases that the act of
state doctrine assumes its relevance.
The cases arising from the Libyan oil nationalization of 197337
present a clear example of a situation envisioned by the Sabbatino
In recent cases, application of the act of state doctrine in the antitrust area has depended
on the degree of government participation in the alleged conspiracy. It has been necessary to
show the government's intimate involvement, in which case the rationales underlying Sab-
batino attach and the court declines adjudication. Thus, in International Ass'n of Machinists
(I.A.M.) v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), I.A.M. sought injunctive relief against the
price setting policies of OPEC which it alleged were damaging to United States industry. Id.
at 1355. The court denied the injunction stating:
The possibility of insult to the OPEC states and of interference with the efforts of
the political branches to seek favorable relations with them is apparent from the
very nature of this action. . . .[T]he granting of any relief would in effect amount
to an order from a domestic court instructing a foreign sovereign to alter its chosen
means of allocating and profiting from its own valuable natural resources.
Id. at 1361. Thus, echoing Sabbatino, the court found that the government was the perpetra-
tor of the price-fixing conspiracy alleged and declined review. Id. Accord General Aircraft
Corp. v. Air Am., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1979); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes
Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
Where insufficient government participation was shown, the doctrine did not apply and
courts have been willing to provide a remedy where appropriate. For example, in Industrial
Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979), plaintiffs alleged that
defendants violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), by infiltrating
plaintiff's Indonesian corporate partner in a proposed logging concession and causing denial
by the Indonesian government of a required logging license. 594 F.2d at 51. The court found
the act of state doctrine inapplicable. To determine whether there had been an antitrust
violation by defendant, it was not necessary to examine the validity of Indonesia's failure to
issue the license. Id. at 53. The court said: "The government of Indonesia is not a named co-
conspirator here. Its right to withhold a cutting license is not questioned. This is the major
factor distinguishing this case from right to ownership cases such as American Banana and
Sabbatino." Id. Accord Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir.
1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
36. See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984
(1977). There, Nelson Bunker Hunt, an independent owner of an oil concession in Libya,
brought suit against several major oil producers (Mobil, Exxon, Shell, Texaco, Standard Oil,
British Petroleum, Gulf Oil, Occidental Petroleum and Grace Petroleum) alleging violation
of antitrust laws and breach of contract. Id. at 70. Hunt claimed that defendants conspired to
preserve the competitiveness of Persian Gulf oil over Libyan oil by preventing him from
reaching a settlement with Libya regarding its participation in Hunt's oil interest. Id. at 76.
He claimed this led ultimately to nationalization of his concession. Id. The court declined to
examine the nationalization, relying on the act of state doctrine which it called "a judicial
articulation of the separation of powers doctrine." Id. at 77.
The United States government called the expropriation a " 'political reprisal against the
United States Government and coercion against the economic interests of certain other
United States nationals in Libya.' " Id. at 73 (footnote omitted) (quoting A. ROVINE, DIGEST
OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 335 (1973)). The court stated that the
"action taken here is obviously only an isolated act in a continuing and broadening confronta-
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court to which the act of state doctrine should apply.38 Colonel
Qadhafi's comments3 on the occasion of Libya's expropriation of
United States interests in Libyan oil illustrate the political, retalia-
tory and discriminatory nature of his act: "We proclaim loudly that
this United States needs to be given a big hard blow in the Arab
area on its cold, insolent face."' 40
Similarly, the courts refused to examine the validity of Castro's
nationalizations which were steeped in political controversy. 41 In
one case, Cuban plaintiffs sought to recover a debt incurred by
American importers for cigars shipped after the takeover. 42 The
court held that the act of state doctrine bars review of a Cuban
takeover of an American-owned cigar enterprise. It also has been
held that the refusal by a Cuban bank to abide by a government
proclamation requiring the bank to convert pesos into dollars con-
stituted an act of state. 43
tion between the East and West in an oil crisis which has [far-reaching] implications and
complications." Id. at 78. See also Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980) (contract obligations for concession arrange-
ments repudiated by Libya did not constitute property for the purposes of the Hickenlooper
Amendment and thus the act of state doctrine was a bar to judicial review); Hunt v. Coastal
State Gas Producing Co., 583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.) (arising from the same Libyan takeover of
Hunt's interests), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
38. Libya's expropriation, like that by Cuba, took place in an atmosphere of intense
political turmoil. Both cases present the potential for judicial interference in the handling of
foreign affairs. As noted earlier, this should be avoided by the courts. See supra notes 29-34
and accompanying text.
39. Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi seized power in 1969 leading a junta which instituted
socialist policies in Libya. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FAcrs 557 (1982).
40. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984
(1977). For a discussion of international arbitration awards in the Libyan nationalization
cases, see von Mehren & Kourides, International Arbitrations Between States and Foreign
Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 476 (1981).
41. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
42. F. Palicio y Compania v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 375 F.2d
1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967). In Palicio, after the government takeover,
interventors took up the manufacture of cigars in plants formerly run by Americans. 256 F.
Supp. at 483. The cigars were sent to United States importers who had been customers of the
former owners and refused to pay the Cuban interventors. Id. at 484. The court said: "these
obligations accrued by reason of sales completed after plaintiffs had been intervened. No
debts were in existence at the time of the intervention. In short, the take-overs were fully
executed under Cuban law before the trade acceptances and other obligations involved in this
dispute arose." Id. at 489. Relying on the rationales set forth in Sabbatino, the court declined
to examine the validity of the takeovers and held that the interventors had the right to sue on
the debt owed. Id. at 489-90.
43. French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 242 N.E.2d 704
(1968). In French, plaintiff's assignor invested in a Cuban farm in 1957, at a time when Cuba
permitted foreign investors to convert the proceeds from their enterprises into dollars and
1982] FRENCH NATIONALIZATION
The rationales for the act of state doctrine as set forth in
Sabbatino44 assume their greatest significance and are most clearly
understood in the context of the Cuban and Arab cases. Such
nationalizations go to the heart of the political relationship between
the United States and the taking state,45 as well as the conduct of
foreign affairs which has been left to the Executive. 4 It is not
appropriate for the courts to interfere in this political relationship
by an adjudication on the merits of the nationalization. 47 In such
instances, diplomacy is the proper method of resolution and may
be, in fact, more effective. 48
French nationalization does not fit the pattern set by Sab-
batino and followed by other Cuban cases and the Libyan oil
exempt such proceeds from Cuba's tax on the exportation of money. Id. at 50, 295 N.Y.S.2d
at 438, 242 N.E.2d at 707. When plaintiff sought to redeem his investment certificates for
dollars, he was refused pursuant to a Cuban government decision promulgated in 1959 to
suspend such conversion in order to stop the flow of foreign currency from Cuba. Id. at 51,
295 N.Y.S.2d at 439, 242 N.E.2d at 708. The court held, "there is no question that the actions
complained of were aimed at protecting Cuba's scarce 'foreign exchange resources.' " Id. at
64, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 450, 242 N.E.2d at 716. Since control of national currency is "an
essential government function," such action constituted an act of state. Id. at 63, 295
N.Y.S.2d at 449, 242 N.E.2d at 715. See also Present v. United States Life Ins. Co., 96
N.J.Super. 285, 232 A.2d 863 (1967), af'd, 51 N.J. 407, 241 A.2d 237 (1968).
44. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
48. Id. For other cases considering the act of state doctrine, see Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Banco Para el
Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1982) (No. 81-984), which relies on the case of
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd,
431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated and remandedfor reconsideration, 400 U.S. 1019, rev'd
on remand, 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd and remanded, 406 U.S. 759, reh'g denied,
409 U.S. 897 (1972), aff'd on remand, 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Arango v.
Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980) (non-performance of a
vacation package contract due to refusal of government to give entry to plaintiff does not
constitute act of state since the doctrine does not preclude judicial resolution of all commer-
cial consequences stemming from public acts); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F.
Supp. 384 (D.C. Del. 1978) (trade policies of the Polish government with respect to the sale of
golfcarts in the United States do not constitute acts of state so as to bar antitrust and
antidumping claims of American manufacturers); Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,
432 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (act of state doctrine precludes inquiry into reason for
denial of import license to United States manufacturer by Brazilian government); Stroganoff-
Scherbatoff v. Weldon, 420 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (act of state precludes suit by
alleged descendant of original owner of artwork expropriated by the Soviet government and
subsequently sold); United Mexican States v. Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1977) (Hicken-
looper amendment inapplicable and act of state doctrine bars suit by plaintiff seeking to
attach Mexican-owned artifacts located in United States on the ground that plaintiff's ranches
in Mexico had been expropriated by the Mexican government).
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nationalization cases. 40 For example, Cuba's nationalization of the
sugar industry was prompted by the United States criticism of
Castro's policies and was in retaliation for a cutback in United
States imports. 50 The legislation expressly addressed only United
States interests and ignored other foreign sugar manufacturers.5 1
Thus, the legislation had its genesis in the political relationship
between Cuba and the United States. Similarly, Libya's confisca-
tion of oil interests was politically motivated-a way for Libya to
defy the United States.52 Furthermore, it was discriminatory in that
the properties of other foreigners in Libya were left undisturbed. 53
French nationalization, by contrast, is not closely tied to the
political relationship between France and the United States. The
French nationalization forms part of the Socialist agenda for
France, a plan to restructure French economic life, 54 with little
consideration given to the impact it might have on international
relations. 55 In contrast to the United States antagonistic relationship
49. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
50. On July 7, 1960, President Eisenhower reduced Cuba's sugar quota. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. at 401.
51. The Cuban decree provided that:
WHEREAS, the attitude assumed by the government and the Legislative Power of
the United States of North America, which constitutes an aggression, for political
purposes, against the basic interests of the Cuban economy . . . the Revolutionary
Government [is forced] to adopt, without hesitation, all and whatever measures it
may deem appropriate or desirable for the due defense of the national sovereignty
and protection of our economic development process ....
S. . Full authority is hereby conferred upon the President and the Prime
Minister of the Republic . . . to nationalize, through forced expropriations, the
propereties or enterprises owned by physical and corporate persons who are nationals
of the United States of North America, or of the enterprises in which such physical
and corporate persons have an interest ....
Act of July 7, 1960, No. 851, 58 Caceta Oficial 16367, 16367 (Cuba) (quoted in Sabbatino,
376 U.S. at 401-02 n.3).
The Sabbatino court wrote that the United States Department of State found the Cuban
law " 'manifestly in violation of those principles of international law which have long been
accepted by the free countries of the West. It is in its essence discriminatory, arbitrary and
confiscatory.' " Id. at 402-03 (citing State Dept. Note No. 397, July 16, 1960).
52. See supra text accompanying note 40.
53. See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984
(1977).
54. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. This is not to ignore the fact that Cuban
and French nationalization share in common an attempt at internal economic restructuring.
However, Cuban nationalization had a political motivation, an element noticeably lacking
from the French takeover.
55. The focus of French concern has been private challenges to the legislation, see infra
note 16, rather than the reaction of the United States government itself.
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with Cuba or Libya, France and the United States are members of
the "western bloc" and have enjoyed a relatively stable political
relationship through the years.56 The nationalization plan has not
been undertaken for any retaliatory purpose, nor does it discrimi-
nate against American interests-all foreign interests are subject to
the same takeover.5 7 Thus, French nationalization does not resem-
ble in any way the political nationalization schemes undertaken by
Cuba's Castro or Libya's Qadhafi. The act of state doctrine as
formulated in Sabbatino and followed in subsequent cases does not
bar judicial review of French nationalization in light of the distinc-
tions outlined above between French nationalization and Cuban or
Libyan nationalization. Furthermore, French nationalization of
American subsidiaries falls within the territorial exception to' the
act of state doctrine, an exception which has been developed by the
federal courts5 8 in the years since Sabbatino.
II. THE TERRITORIAL EXCEPTION TO THE
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The federal courts have recognized a limitation to the act of
state doctrine which makes it applicable only to confiscation of
property located in the taking state.59 The territorial exception to
the doctrine allows courts to refuse to give extraterritorial effect to
confiscatory decrees aimed at property located within the United
States."° The justification for the exception is found in the express
language of Underhill v. Hernandez: 61 "the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. '6 2
Property targeted for nationalization located in the United
States renders superfluous the rationales 3 underlying Sabbatino.
An examination by a United States court of the validity of the
56. See, by contrast, discussion of the relationship between the United States and Cuba,
supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
57. See Nationalization Bill, supra note 1.
58. See cases discussed infra notes 59-111 and accompanying text.
59. See Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
60. Id.
61. 168 U.S. 250 (1897), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 22 and 23.
62. Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
63. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
1982]
134 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:121
attempted confiscation of such property poses no threat to amicable
relations 4 between the United States and the would-be nationaliz-
ing state. The court would not be determining rights to property
located in a foreign nation.6 5 Such adjudication does not offend the
sovereignty66 of the taking state since that state is not in a position
to compel disposition of the property.6 7 Furthermore, diplomatic
negotiation plays no role under these circumstances. The property
is already located in the United States and the Executive need not
negotiate for its return.68
In a variety of situations the federal courts have applied the
territorial exception to property found to be located in the United
States. Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank6" was the first
circuit court case 70 in the post-Sabbatino era to articulate the terri-
torial exception. The controversy centered around a New York bank
64. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
67. See cases discussed infra notes 85-111 and accompanying text.
68. See supra text accompanying note 34.
69. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
70. Traditionally, courts have recognized that foreign acts of confiscation are presumed
to violate the public policy of the United States forum and should not be given extraterritorial
effect. See Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541 (1927); United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580 (1911); Zwack v.
Kraus Bros., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956); Plesch v. Banque Nationale de la R6publique
d'Haiti, 273 A.D. 224, 77 N.Y.S.2d 43, ajfd, 298 N.Y. 573, 81 N.E.2d,106 (1948); Vladi-
kavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934).
In Zwack, plaintiff's Hungarian liqueur exporting firm was nationalized and suit was
brought against its exclusive American distributing agent for an accounting of profits made as
a result of the continued sale of the liqueur by the defendant and for trademark infringement.
237 F.2d at 257-58. The court held:
It is clear that the Hungarian government could not directly seize the assets which
have a situs in the state of the forum. To allow it to do so indirectly through
confiscation of firm ownership would be to give its decree extraterritorial effect and
thereby emasculate the public policy of the forum against confiscation. This we
decline to do.
Id. at 259.
As early as 1939, the reluctance of the courts to give effect to foreign nationalization
decrees in the United States was apparent. In Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York, 280
N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d 758 (1939), afJ'd per curiam ub nom. United States v. Moscow Fire Ins.
Co., 309 U.S. 624 (1940), discussed infra note 134, the court declined to give effect to Soviet
nationalization of property claimed by the United States government. The property was
"what remain[ed] of the capital which this State required the insurance company to deposit
here. . . . It is the property which at all times has been within the State of New York. . . . At
no time could the insurance company or the Russian government have transferred it to
Russia." Id. at 308, 20 N.E.2d at 766. The court concluded "[i]n the strongest sense its situs
was in this State, and the control of this State complete." Id.
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account issued to King Faisal II of Iraq. The Republic of Iraq
attempted to seize money and shares of stock held by First National
City Bank on behalf of King Faisal, who was assassinated in 1958
during an Iraqi revolution. 71 The attempted seizure was pursuant
to a government decree that "all property [of the dynasty] ...
whether moveable or immoveable ... should be confiscated. ' 72
The court held that a New York bank account, although issued to
the King, was located in New York rather than Iraq.73 The court
held that only a United States court could require the bank to turn
over the assets to Iraq.74 Therefore the property in issue could not
be considered to be in Iraq. 75
The principal task of the Second Circuit in Republic of Iraq
was to define the application of the act of state doctrine to foreign
confiscatory decrees addressed to property located in the United
States.76 The development of the territorial exception by the court
was couched in the framework of the rationales 77 underlying the
act of state doctrine, especially the concept that a foreign act of
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), presented facts identical to those of Moscow
Fire. The Court, however, reached a contrary result while not overruling its earlier decision.
Id. at 216. In fact, Justice White, in his dissenting opinion in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), cited Moscow Fire to support his argument that "foreign
confiscatory decrees purporting to divest nationals and corporations of the foreign sovereign
of property located in the United States uniformly have been denied effect in our courts,
including this Court ...." 376 U.S. at 447.
United States v. Pink involved a claim by the United States acquired under the Litvinov
Assignment of 1933. Under the agreement the Soviet government assigned its claims against
American nationals to the United States in exchange for the United States' diplomatic
recognition of the Soviet government. 315 U.S. at 211-12. The Court found that Moscow Fire
was not res judicata since the respondent had not been a party to that suit. Id. at 216.
The Court in Pink allowed the confiscation of the assets of a New York insurance
company under the Soviet nationalization decree of 1918, relying on the constitutional power
of the Executive branch to conduct foreign affairs. Id. at 229. The Court viewed the Litvinov
Assignment and diplomatic recognition of the Soviet government as an aspect of this foreign
affairs power, id., and as part of a broad attempt by the United States to remove any source
of friction between the United States and the Soviet Union. Id. at 225. Pink is distinguishable
from Zwack in that Zwack did not involve a comparable political arrangement. For a case in
accord with Zwack, see D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Del. 1976),
aJJ'd, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
71. 353 F.2d at 49.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 51.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 50.
77. Id.
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state is within the sphere of foreign affairs. 78 Similarly, the decision
to give effect to foreign confiscatory decrees which relate to prop-
erty located in the United States is tied to foreign affairs7 with a
consequent need for uniformity among the states. "It would be
baffling if a foreign act of state intended to affect property in the
United States were ignored on one side of the Hudson but respected
on the other .... -80
The court in Republic of Iraq stated that the primary consider-
ation for a court exercising its discretion to give extraterritorial
effect to a foreign confiscatory decree is whether the decree is
consistent with the law and policy of the United States. 81 The court
concluded that the Iraqi ordinance was inconsistent with United
States law and policy,82 particularly in view of general constitu-
tional guarantees of due process embodied in the fifth and four-
teenth amendments to the Constitution as well as the prohibition
against bills of attainder.8 3 These principles recognize a constitu-
tional repugnance for governmental confiscation of private prop-
erty. 84
The focus of the territorial exception shifted in Tabacalera
Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co.85 There suit was
brought after the Cuban revolution by a Cuban seller against a
Florida buyer to collect the purchase price of a contract for the sale
of tobacco which predated the revolution. 8 The court found that
the act of state doctrine did not bar the collection of the debt,
which was found to have its situs in Florida, and applied the
territorial exception. 87
The court distinguished Tabacalera from Sabbatino in one
particularly significant respect. In Sabbatino, the res that was the
subject of the suit was tangible personal property present in Cuban
territorial waters at the time of the nationalization, whereas in
Tabacalera the res was a credit owed by a Florida corporation on
78. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
79. 353 F.2d at 50.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 51.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 52. See supra note 9.
84. 353 F.2d at 52.
85. 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
86. Id. at 711.
87. Id. at 716.
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tobacco delivered and accepted. Moreover, the funds which Stand-
ard would have used to satisfy that debt were located in Florida.
Compulsion to pay the debt could have been accomplished only by
a United States court. 88 The court justified its application of the
territorial exception by relying on the fact that "the government of
Cuba was not physically in a position to perform a fait accompli in
the nature of the acquisition by the Cuban government or its inter-
ventor of the money owed to Tabacalera by Standard Cigar Com-
pany." 8 The Fifth Circuit in Tabacalera reiterated the position
taken by the Second Circuit in Republic of Iraq90 and considered
whether the political relationship between the United States and
Cuba required the court to give effect to the Cuban confiscatory
decree. 91 The issue of international relations, however, was found
to be of secondary importance.9 2
Subsequent cases9 3 have followed this analysis and have placed
primary emphasis upon the notion that the foreign taking state is
not in a position to perform a fait accompli over property located in
the United States. Considerations of foreign policy and notions of
88. Id. at 712-13. The court called this the "really important difference" between the two
cases. Id. at 713. A second distinction between the cases was that although the Cuban
tobacco industry was nationalized in 1960 and Tabacalera was intervened by the govern-
ment, id. at 709, the power of attorney held by Severiano Jorge, the sole stockholder of
Tabacalera, was not revoked by the government. The power of attorney included the
authority to collect debts owed to the corporation. Id. at 713-14. The court noted that by
contrast in Sabbatino, the government had undertaken a "direct and open confiscation" of
the property of the sugar corporation. Id. at 712. In Tabacalera "there was no confiscation of
the kind exercised by Cuba as to the sugar in Sabbatino." Id. at 714. Furthermore, the court
found that even had the Cuban government taken over Tabacalera, as the government's
unlimited power under the nationalization program would have allowed, the takeover would
not require the United States court to recognize the confiscation since the property was in the
United States. Id. The court said:
The underlying thought expressed in all of the cases touching on the Act of State
Doctrine is a common-sense one. It is that when a foreign government performs an
act of state which is an accomplished fact, that is when it has the parties and the res
before it and acts in such a manner as to change the relationship between the parties
touching the res, it would be an affront to such foreign government for courts of the
United States to hold that such act was a nullity. Furthermore, it is plain that the
decisions took into consideration the realization that in most situations there was
nothing the United States courts could do about it in any event.
Id. at 715.
89. Id.
90. 353 F.2d 47 (2d. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
91. 392 F.2d at 715.
92. Id.
93. See infra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
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due process have become secondary in the analysis. 4 In United
Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic International, Inc.,9 5 a debt owed by a United
States corporate defendant for goods supplied by a Pakistani plain-
tiff was held to have its situs in the United States.96 The dispute
arose after nationalization of a Pakistani jute mill by the revolution-
ary government of Bangladesh.9 7 The Second Circuit rejected the
arguments of the post-nationalization Bangladesh mill owners who
asserted that the act of state doctrine precluded an examination of
the validity of the taking. 8
The court, holding the situs of the debt to be in the United
States, explained that the power to enforce a debt depends on
jurisdiction over the debtor and borrowed from the reasoning of the
Fifth Circuit in Tabacalera: "Where an act of state has not 'come to
complete fruition within the dominion of ...[a foreign] govern-
ment, . . . no fait accompli has occurred which would otherwise
effectively prevent an American court from reviewing the act's
validity."9 9 The court noted that the absence of such accomplished
fact eliminates the danger of the judiciary offending the foreign
state's sovereignty or interfering with executive function. 00
The Fifth Circuit again upheld the territorial exception to the
act of state doctrine in Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co. 101 The
court found that trademark registration of goods manufactured
outside the United States constitutes property located in the United
States for the purposes of the exception. 0 2 The court held that
Cuba's dissolution of a Cuban corporation did not bar the use of the
corporation's trademarks in the United States. 0 3 Such trademarks
are considered to have a local identity apart from the foreign
manufacturer. 04
94. Id.
95. 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976).
96. Id. at 877.
97. Id. at 870 n.2 (where the court noted that effective March, 1971, India had issued a
Proclamation of Independence declaring that East Pakistan became the sovereign state of
Bangladesh after a revolution).
98. Id at 877.
99. Id. at 874.
100. Id. at 875 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964), and Maltina Corp. v. Cawy
Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021, 1028-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972)). Maltina
is discussed infra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
101. 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972).
102. Id. at 1027.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1026. Accord Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971).
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Citing the earlier territorial exception cases, 05 the Maltina
court stated: "the federal courts are to take a pragmatic view of
what constitutes an extraterritorial action by a foreign state."'0 6 To
deny effect to the Cuban confiscation would have the desirable
consequence of preventing Cuba from controlling the "disposition
of valuable assets" 107 in the United States. Furthermore, depriva-
tion of the trademarks without compensation by Cuba would vio-
late notions of due process. 0 8 Although the court recognized the
potential foreign affairs implications of the attempted extraterritor-
ial expropriation, the court emphasized that since the trademarks
were within the jurisdiction of the United States, Cuba was not in a
position to accomplish the expropriation. 09 Thus, the court's deci-
sion did not touch on the propriety of Cuba's acts as to property in
Cuba, and could not thereby offend Cuba's sovereignty."l 0
In summary, three recurrent themes are woven throughout the
cases formulating a territorial exception to the act of state doctrine.
These themes justify the exception. First, and perhaps most signifi-
cant, when property is located in the United States rather than
within the territory of the taking state, the foreign state is not in a
position to perform a fait accompli over the property. Thus, refusal
by a United States court to give effect to confiscation under these
circumstances is justified because it does not call into question any
disposition of property by the foreign state within its domain.
Second, it is within the discretion of the United States courts to
consider the political relationship between the sovereign parties in
105. Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966); F., Palicio y Compania v. Brush, 256 F. Supp.
481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), afj'd, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967).
106. 462 F.2d at 1027.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1028. It is noteworthy that the Maltina court interpreted Sabbatino as a suit by
Banco Nacional to recover money located in the United States. Id. The court, however, said
that Sabbatino should not be interpreted as removing the territorial restriction to the act of
state doctrine because the "expropriation of sugar constituting the Act of State" came to
fruition within the dominion of the Cuban government. Id. This is in contrast to the
interpretation of Sabbatino by the court in Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard
Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968), discussed supra note 85
and accompanying text. There the court said "in the Sabbatino case the res that was subject
to confiscation by the Cuban government was physical property present in Cuba. ... Id.
at 714.
110. 462 F.2d at 1029.
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determining whether to give effect to foreign confiscatory decrees.
Finally, courts are unwilling to enforce foreign confiscatory decrees
in light of constitutional repugnance for deprivation of property
embodied in the United States Constitution."'
III. APPLICATION OF THE TERRITORIAL EXCEPTION
TO FRENCH NATIONALIZATION OF
AMERICAN SUBSIDIARIES
The territorial exception to the act of state doctrine is a well-
established principle of law, applied consistently by the federal
courts to a variety of cases." 2 The recent attempt by the Govern-
ment of France to nationalize American subsidiaries along with
their French parent corporations presents an opportunity to apply
the rationales behind the exception.
111. For cases wherein the territorial exception was rejected on facts distinguishable from
those of the present case, see F. Palicio y Compania v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), afJ'd, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967), discussed supra note
42, and Tran Qui Than v. Blumenthal, 469 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Cal. 1979), affd in part,
remanded in part on other grounds, sub nom. Tran Qui Than v. Regan, 658 F.2d 1296 (9th
Cir. 1981), appeal docketed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3984 (U.S. June 15, 1982) (No. 81-2219).
In Palicio, the territorial exception did not bar application of the act of state doctrine
because none of the property confiscated was within the United Staes at the time of the
confiscation. 256 F. Supp. at 487. The nationalization was fully executed before the dispute
arose as to whether the debt for the sale of cigars was owed to the Cuban interventors or the
former owners, and the court declined to review the validity of the taking. Id. at 489.
Tran Qui Than reaffirmed the territorial exception, although finding it inapplicable to
the facts. 469 F. Supp. at 1209-10. It is the most recent pronouncement to date of the
territorial exception as developed in the Second and Fifth Circuits. In that case, plaintiff was
a shareholder in a South Vietnamese bank and claimed an interest in funds owed by the
United States government to the bank on army contracts. Id. at 1204-05. After the fall of
Saigon in 1975, Vietnamese funds in the United States were blocked under the Foreign Assets
Control of the Treasury Department and the Trading with the Enemy Act. Id. at 1205.
Plaintiff argued for unblocking the funds, contending that failure to do so conflicted with the
territorial exception to the act of state doctrine. Id. at 1209-10. The court agreed that United
States courts may decline to give effect to confiscatory decrees. Id. In this case, however,
Viet-Nam was not a party to the action and the validity of Vietnamese confiscation was not in
question: "What Tran seeks to do here is to convert a shield against the enforcement of claims
derived from foreign expropriation into a sword to frustrate the marshalling by the Executive
Branch of assets to which a foreign government may lay claim in the future." Id. at 1210. In
the territorial exception cases, the courts were determining disputed rights to property as
between the original owner and a government purporting to confiscate that property. By
contrast, in Tran Qui Than, "no such issue arises, for the Court does not decide who will be
entitled to the funds." Id.
112. See supra notes 59-110 and accompanying text.
FRENCH NATIONALIZATION
The basis of the territorial exception is territorial jurisdic-
tion. 1 13 The United States has jurisdiction over property which is
located in the United States1 4 and has the authority and power to
act1 5 against that property. By contrast, the foreign state is in no
position to compel disposition of such property." 8
As a threshold matter in all the territorial exception cases it
must be established that there is property located in the United
States over which United States courts may exert their power. In
the case of French nationalization, there are several indicia that the
American subsidiaries are property located in the United States
subject to the jurisdiction of its courts. First, the way in which the
law locates shares of stock which are embodied in share certificates,
is analyzed. Then, the location of a corporation is examined from
the point of view of jurisdiction and choice of law.
This analysis requires an understanding of the difference be-
tween physical goods, like tables and chairs, and a corporation. It is
perhaps simple to see that tables and chairs in a New York office
building are property located in the United States. If France pur-
ported to nationalize all property belonging to French businesses
anywhere in the world, a court could find that under the territorial
113. Id.
114. The Supreme Court recognized in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), that
restrictions on jurisdiction "are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or
distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the
respective States." Id. at 251. The jurisdiction of the United States, as a separate sovereign, is
restrained by territorial boundaries as well. See Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate
Contacts: A Genuinely Federal jurisdictional Standard, 95 HARv. L. REV. 470 (1981).
115. One commentator has written:
The word "jurisdiction" has too many meanings. Because of that it is a prime
source of confusion and ambiguity in the law ....
One sense in which the word is used, commonly spoken of as relating to
"judicial jurisdiction," has to do with whether a court has power to act against the
particular person. . . against whom, or the thing against which, the court is asked
to act. . . . Judicial jurisdiction . . . normally depends on the validity of service of
process ....
R. LEFLAa, AMERICAN CONFLICrS LAW § 3, (1968). For more recent comments on the nature
of jurisdiction and conflicts of law see Hill, Choice of Law and jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 960 (1981) and Leflar, The Nature of Conflicts Law, 81 COLUM.
L. REv. 1080 (1981).
116. This is, of course, different from the case where both the United States and the
foreign state have jurisdiction. For a discussion of this problem see Maier, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law,
76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982).
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exception, chairs located in New York were beyond the reach of the
French nationalization decree. " 7 By contrast, a corporation is more
complex and more difficult to locate-it is a creation of the law." 8
Chief Justice Marshall in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward"9 defined a corporation as "an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the
mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the
charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as inci-
dental to its very existence." 2 0
The situs of a share of stock, represented by a share certificate,
is in the state that incorporates the issuer.12 This would support a
finding that American subsidiaries are located in the United States
for purposes of the territorial exception. This principle was first
enunciated in 1899 by the Supreme Court in Jellenik v. Huron
Copper Mining Co.122 The Court, attempting to determine stock
ownership, considered whether the stock in question was personal
property within the district where the suit was brought.12 3 The
Court wrote: "As the habitation or domicil of the Company is and
must be in the State that created it, the property represented by its
certificates of stock may be deemed to be held by the Company
117. Such a case would be analogous to the territorial exception cases discussed supra notes
49-110 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
119. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 629 (1819).
120. Id. at 636. For other definitions of a corporation, see 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PIVATE COPORATIONS § 4 (rev. perm, ed. 1974).
121. U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1976).
In Gregg, the court stated: "courts have accepted the view of Justice Holmes that the
'foundation of jurisdiction is physical power.' .... The state of a corporation's domicile may
constitutionally provide, as Delaware has done, that the situs of its capital stock is in its home
state." Id. at 149 (quoting McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917)). The Gregg court
referred to Delaware law which provides: "For all purposes of title, action, attachment,
garnishment and jurisdiction .. . the situs of the ownership of the capital stock of all
corporations existing under the laws of this State. . .shall be regarded as in this State." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1975).
The New York courts have applied this rule. See Oliner v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 34
A.D.2d 310, 311 N.Y.S. 2d 429, afJ'd, 27 N.Y.2d 988, 318 N.Y.S.2d 745, 267 N.E.2d 480
(1970); In re Nielsen, 48 Misc.2d 66, 264 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1965). In Holmes v. Camp, 219 N.Y.
359, 114 N.E. 841 (1916), the court stated: "the interest of a stockholder in the capital of a
corporation may be regarded as property located where the corporation is organized and
exists .... I d. at 367, 114 N.E. at 843.
122. 177 U.S. 1 (1899).
123. Id. at 13.
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within the State whose creature it is .... ,"124 Under this rule, share
certificates of an American subsidiary of a French corporation,
regardless of where in the world they may be held, and irrespective
of the nationality of the holder, would be considered to have their
situs in the United States, specifically in the state of the issuer. 25
Such shares constitute property in the United States, beyond the
reach of the French nationalization decree.
A second aspect of the analysis considers the way in which the
law locates a corporation for the purposes of choice of law. Under
Anglo-American concepts, a corporation is considered a citizen of
the state or country of its incorporation.12 The law of the state of
incorporation governs a variety of corporate obligations, including
corporate dissolution, 127 the legal relationship between a stock-
124. Id. See also Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1932) (concerning the
cancellation of the allotted shares and other relief sought, the situs of the stock is in the state
of incorporation, New Jersey). Several other circuit courts have also so held. See, e.g., Kitzer
v. Phalen Park State Bank, 379 F.2d 650 (8th Cir. 1967) ("Corporate shares of stock... have
long been considered 'property' by the Supreme Court of the United States for jurisdictional
purposes in an action to clear title of stock. ... Id. at 653 (citing Jellenik, 177 U.S. 1
(1899)); Peckham v. Ronrico Corp., 211 F.2d 727 (1st Cir. 1954) ("shares in a corporation are
personal property located for the purposes of a suit to determine title to the shares in the state
which created the corporation." Id. at 731); Albuquerque Nat. Bank v. Citizens Nat. Bank in
Abilene, 212 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1954) (for the purposes of administration of estates, rather
than the state of decedent's domicil, irrespective of the place where the certificates happen to
be, the state of incorporation is situs of its shares of stock. Id. at 950); Miller v. Kaliwerke
Aschersleben, A.G., 283 F. 746 (2d Cir. 1922) (in a case brought under the Trading with the
Enemy Act, "shares of stock being intangible, incorporeal, personal property, their situs for
purposes of seizure is in the state which creates the corporation and where it resides." Id. at
755).
125. 177 U.S. at 13.
126. Hadari, The Choice of National Law Applicable to the Multinational Enterprise and
the Nationality of Such Enterprises, 1974 DuKE L.J. 1. This is in contrast to the civil law rule
which decides the nationality of companies according to their principal place of business,
called the sige reble, or company seat. Id. at 7-11.
The United States Supreme Court early in this century held:
A corporation created by and doing business in a particular State, is to be deemed to
all intents and purposes as a person, although an artificial person, . . . capable of
being treated as a citizen of that State, as much as a natural person . . . . [W]hen
the corporation exercises its powers in the State which chartered it, that is its
residence, and such an averment is sufficient to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction.
Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579, 586 (1905) (citing Louisville C. & C. R.R. v.
Letson, 15 U.S. (2 How.) 193 (1844)). See also International Milling Co. v. Colum-
bia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934); Continental Nat'l Bank v. Buford, 191 U.S.
119 (1903).
127. R. L.FL, supra note 115, § 252. Leflar states:
[i]f the theory be accepted that a corporation can come into existence, if at all, only
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holder and the corporation, 2 8 and enforcement of stockholder,
director and officer statutory obligations.12 This rule regarding
corporate obligations illustrates that incorporation in the United
States bestows upon a subsidiary corporation 30 a United States
location.
A final aspect of the analysis requires consideration of how
courts obtain personal jurisdiction over a corporation. As a general
rule, service of process may be made in the state of incorporation ' 31
or where the corporation does sufficient business to establish mini-
mum contacts."'' 32 In spite of its ties to the parent, a subsidiary
corporation is subject to this general rule. For the purposes of
jurisdiction and service of process, courts honor the separateness of
parent and subsidiary. 133 The law presumes this separateness. 134
by the law of the state which creates it, a logical corollary is that the only state
whose law can destroy the corporation's existence is the one whose law brought it
into being in the first place.
Id.
128. Id. § 253. Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 64 (1969).
129. R. LEFLAR, supra note 115, § 254.
130. An American subsidiary is one incorporated in the United States. It should be noted
that a foreign corporation also can be licensed to do business in the United States without
creating a subsidiary. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1301 (McKinney 1963).
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
132. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945).
133. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
134. Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir. 1980) (there
is a presumption of separateness). Generally, parent and subsidiary within the multinational
enterprise are considered separate entities even where management is identical and the
parent owns all of the stock of the subsidiary. Hadari, The Structure of the Private Multina-
tional Enterprise, 71 MICH. L. REv. 729, 770 (1973). For further discussion of the multina-
tional corporation, see R. HELLMAN, TRANSNATIONAL CONTROL OF MULTINATIONAL COR'O-
RATIONS (1977).
The idea of a separate legal existence for parent and subsidiary is not a new one; it
predates the modern era of the large multinational enterprise, as illustrated in Moscow Fire
Insurance Co. v. Bank of New York, 280 N.Y. 286,20 N.E.2d 758 (1939), af'd per curiam
sub nom. United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 309 U.S. 624 (1940), discussed supra note
70. There the question entertained by the New York Court of Appeals was whether Soviet
nationalization extended to a New York branch of a Soviet insurance company. Answering in
the negative, the court said:
we think the Legislature in allowing these foreign companies to do business in this
State and country intended to treat the domestic agency largely as a complete and
separate organization, to place it on a parity with domestic corporations .... Thus
the property of the United States branch of a foreign insurance company acquires a
character of its own. That character is "dependent" upon the law of this State.
Id. at 309-10, 20 N.E.2d at 768. This holding was later affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court. 309 U.S. 624 (1940).
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This is illustrated by the fact that while a subsidiary incorporated
under the laws of the United States is located in the United
States, 135 the presence of the subsidiary does not in and of itself
constitute presence of the parent.' 36 In order for the parent to be
present and amenable to process in the state which incorporates the
subsidiary, the two corporations must operate as one so that the
subsidiary is no more than a "mere department"137 of the parent.
The subsidiary must be a "mere shell." 138
These three approaches support the position that American
subsidiaries of French corporations must be deemed to be located in
135. See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
136. Velandra v. Rgie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1964).
Accord Cook v. Bostitch, Inc., 328 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1964). This general rule is drawn from the
early decision of the Supreme Court in Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S.
333 (1925). It should be noted that under the rule of International Shoe v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945), the parent may by its own activities establish minimum contacts and
thereby subject itself to jurisdiction in the state where its subsidiary is located or does
business.
In the Renault case the French parent, Rgie, owned 100% of the stock of Renault, a
New York corporation which in turn owned 100% of Great Lakes Renault, an Illinois
corporation which distributed cars in the midwest. 336 F.2d at 295-96. Suit was brought in
Michigan, one of the states where Great Lakes sold cars. Id. at 296. The court held that "the
mere ownership by a corporation of all of the stock of a subsidiary amenable to the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of a state may not alone be sufficient to justify holding the parent
corporation likewise amenable." Id. (emphasis included).
137. Marantis v. Dolphin Aviation, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 803, 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In
Marantis, the court held that the separateness between parent and subsidiary precluded the
parent's amenability to service. Id. The subsidiary was incorporated in the state where the
parent was headquartered and conducted board meetings in that state. Three of the four
principle officers of the subsidiary held the same offices for the parent and all but one of the
directors of the subsidiary was an officer or director of the parent. The parent filed a
financing statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission indicating that the subsid-
iary was wholly-owned. The subsidiary purchased for resale from the parent and was a
regular customer of the parent. Id. These factors might appear to connect parent and
subsidiary inextricably, but the court's finding indicates the strength of the presumption of
separateness, the court said: " 'The control over the subsidiary's activities ... must be so
complete that the subsidiary is, in fact, merely a department of the parent." Id. (quoting
Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 432, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653, 657, 278 N.E.2d 895,
897 (1972)). Accord Taca Int'l Airlines v. Rolls-Royce of England, Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 256
N.Y.S.2d 129, 204 N.E.2d 329 (1965). See also Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v.
Almogy, 510 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). But cJ. Jayne v. Royal Jordanian Airlines, 502 F.
Supp 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (-in wrongful death and survival actions, the court found that
the "easy interchange between the two companies in financial, promotional, and operational
matters indicates that ALIA [parent] considers Arab Wings [subsidiary] to be a part of its
total airline services offering." Id. at 859).
138. Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir. 1980).
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the United States. The United States bestows upon them their
corporate existence. The justification for the territorial exception,
as developed in the case law, 39 applies with equal force here. A
review by a United States court of French nationalization would
not offend French judicial authority or sovereignty since a French
court would not be in a position to perform a fait accompli over an
American subsidiary.
The decision whether to give extraterritorial effect to national-
ization decrees of France under the territorial exception as articu-
lated in the federal courts, would be within the discretion of the
courts. Such discretion would entail primarily a consideration of
the foreign policy ramifications of the nationalization- whether
some aspect of the political relationship between the United States
and France required deference to French nationalization. Defer-
ence to the French takeover would leave American plaintiffs with-
out a remedy. Arguably the courts would hesitate to find the rela-
tionship between the United States and France so fragile as to
require enforcement of the nationalization law. Perhaps so as not to
jeopardize such a remedy, even the relationship between the United
States and Cuba, a more politically charged one, was not held to be
of such overriding importance as to require enforcement of the
Cuban decrees. The discretion afforded the courts is a power re-
served but, as yet, not exercised.
The final justification for the territorial exception to the act of
state doctrine is the repugnance of courts of the United States for
confiscatory takings in view of constitutional notions of due process.
Certainly these notions would come into play in the determination
by United States courts whether to give extraterritorial effect to
French nationalization legislation.
CONCLUSION
The French nationalization of United States subsidiaries of
French corporations is a recent example of a situation envisioned by
the courts where the territorial exception to the act of state doctrine
might apply. The arguments favoring the conclusion that the sub-
139. See infra notes 69-111 and accompanying text.
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sidiaries are property located in the United States equally favor the
conclusion that the territorial exception should be invoked. French
nationalization is therefore a proper subject of review by United
States courts which should find the legislation inapplicable to
United States subsidiaries.
Carolyn B. Levine
